Systemic failures drive Rohingya sea migrations: militarised borders, camp apartheid, and global abandonment fuel deadly crossings

Rohingya identity is rooted in Rakhine State’s indigenous communities, with historical ties to the Arakan Kingdom (8th–18th centuries), but Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law erased this continuity by classifying them as 'Bengali' immigrants. Indigenous Rakhine and Chin groups, despite their own marginalisation under the junta, have occasionally sheltered Rohingya fleeing violence, challenging the state’s monolithic narrative of ethnic homogeneity. The erasure of Rohingya’s indigenous status in Myanmar’s legal framework is a tool of demographic engineering, not a reflection of historical reality.

The Rohingya crisis is the latest iteration of Myanmar’s century-long project of ethnic cleansing, from British colonial-era 'divide-and-rule' policies to the 1942 Arakan massacres, 1978 'Operation Nagamin,' and 2017 'clearance operations.' Bangladesh’s 1991–92 crackdown on Rohingya refugees set a precedent for coercive containment, while Thailand’s 2008–09 'pushback' operations normalised maritime interdiction. The 2015 'boat crisis' saw 8,000 Rohingya stranded at sea, revealing ASEAN’s structural failure to address displacement as a regional, not bilateral, issue.

In Malaysia, Rohingya refugees navigate a paradox: while the state denies them legal status, Muslim-majority communities (e.g., PAS party supporters) often provide clandestine support, reflecting shared religious identity but not political solidarity. In Indonesia’s Aceh, local fishermen’s rescue of Rohingya boats (2020–23) contrasts with the government’s refusal to grant asylum, highlighting a grassroots humanitarian ethos absent in state policy. The global Muslim ummah’s silence on Rohingya persecution—despite Gaza’s mobilisation—reveals how geopolitical Islamophobia trumps religious solidarity.

Studies show Rohingya displacement is driven by a combination of state violence (Myanmar’s military’s 2017 genocidal campaign), economic deprivation (camp restrictions on livelihoods), and climate stressors (Rakhine’s eroding agricultural land). The 'boat migration' phenomenon is a rational response to blocked legal pathways, with survival rates improving when rescue operations are prioritised (e.g., 2020 Aceh rescues). However, the lack of systematic data on deaths at sea (only 250 missing in the cited case) reflects the invisibilisation of maritime tragedies in global migration statistics.

Rohingya oral histories, preserved in refugee camps, narrate displacement as a cyclical trauma tied to Buddhist-Muslim cosmologies of purity and pollution, where the land itself is sacred and 'foreign' bodies are pollutants. Artistic resistance—such as the Rohingya poetry of Kazi Nur Sultan or the 'Boat People Project' by refugee artists—challenges the erasure of Rohingya culture, framing flight as an act of spiritual defiance. In Malaysia, Rohingya musicians blend Arakanese melodies with Islamic devotional songs, creating a diasporic identity that transcends state borders.

Without structural changes, Rohingya sea migrations will escalate as climate change reduces arable land in Rakhine State and Myanmar’s junta consolidates power, pushing more to flee. Scenario modelling suggests that if ASEAN adopts a regional protection framework (e.g., 2016–2020 draft agreement) and Myanmar’s junta faces ICC sanctions, displacement could stabilise within a decade. However, if current policies persist, the Andaman Sea will become a mass grave, with 5,000–10,000 Rohingya at risk annually by 2030, mirroring the Mediterranean crisis.

Rohingya women like Rahila Begum are doubly marginalised: as refugees denied agency in camp governance and as survivors whose trauma is instrumentalised for fundraising while their leadership is ignored. The voices of Rohingya activists (e.g., Wai Wai Nu, founder of the Women’s Peace Network) are systematically excluded from policy discussions, despite their grassroots repatriation efforts. Children born in camps (e.g., Kutupalong) face statelessness as a birthright, with no legal recourse to citizenship in Myanmar or Bangladesh.