Orbán’s electoral defeat exposes Hungary’s authoritarian drift amid EU democratic backsliding and oligarchic consolidation

Hungarian Roma communities and other minorities have long documented Orbán’s systemic exclusionary policies, from segregated education to the criminalisation of homelessness, framed as ‘national cohesion.’ The ‘national side’ rhetoric echoes 19th-century Magyarisation campaigns that erased non-Hungarian identities, revealing a continuity of state-sponsored assimilation. Indigenous Hungarian intellectuals, such as those in the *Hagyományvédelem* (Tradition Protection) movement, critique Orbán’s ‘Christian democracy’ as a thinly veiled ethnocracy that denies Hungary’s multicultural heritage. Yet these voices are systematically marginalised in Western media, which frames Orbán’s defeat as a victory for ‘European values’ without interrogating whose values are being defended.

Orbán’s 2024 defeat echoes the 1956 Hungarian Revolution’s failure to sustain democratic reforms, highlighting the cyclical nature of Hungarian political resistance against authoritarianism. His 12-year rule mirrors the ‘soft authoritarian’ patterns of interwar Central Europe, where populist leaders exploited economic crises to dismantle liberal institutions under the guise of ‘stability.’ The EU’s current crisis of democratic backsliding parallels the 1930s failure of international organisations to curb fascist expansion, suggesting structural parallels in how liberal democracies respond to authoritarian resurgence. Orbán’s ‘illiberal democracy’ model draws directly from Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, repurposed for 21st-century electoral authoritarianism.

Orbán’s playbook resembles Turkey’s Erdoğan, who similarly used electoral victories to justify constitutional overhauls that centralised power while maintaining formal democratic legitimacy. In India, Modi’s BJP has adopted Orbán’s ‘cultural nationalism’ tactics, framing opposition as ‘anti-national’ to justify crackdowns on dissent, mirroring Hungary’s ‘Soros conspiracy’ narratives. The Philippines’ Duterte and Brazil’s Bolsonaro both leveraged ‘strongman’ rhetoric to erode judicial independence, showing how populist authoritarianism adapts across cultural contexts. Across these cases, the common thread is the fusion of majoritarianism with state-controlled media to manufacture consent.

Political science research (e.g., Levitsky & Ziblatt’s *How Democracies Die*) demonstrates that authoritarian leaders rarely seize power outright but incrementally erode democratic norms through legalistic means. Orbán’s ‘landslide’ victory in 2010 (two-thirds parliamentary majority) enabled him to rewrite Hungary’s constitution, pack courts, and control media—mechanisms documented in studies of electoral authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006). The 2024 opposition ‘landslide’ masks the fact that Orbán’s Fidesz still won 44% of the vote, revealing the persistence of his electoral base despite democratic erosion. EU election observation reports consistently flag Hungary’s ‘unlevel playing field’ due to media bias and gerrymandering, yet enforcement remains weak.

Hungarian folk traditions, such as the *kuruc* resistance ballads, have long framed rebellion against authoritarian rule as a moral duty, contrasting with Orbán’s ‘national side’ as a state-imposed identity. The 2024 opposition’s victory was symbolically tied to the 1989 reburial of Imre Nagy, linking democratic aspirations across generations through ritual and memory. Orbán’s use of Christian symbolism (e.g., ‘Christian democracy’) mirrors medieval Hungarian kings’ claims to divine right, revealing how authoritarianism co-opts spiritual narratives. Meanwhile, Roma artists like Márta Sebestyén have used folk music to critique Orbán’s policies, offering a counter-narrative rooted in Hungary’s multicultural past.

If Orbán’s ‘national side’ project fails to regain dominance, Hungary may face a prolonged period of political instability, with opposition coalitions fracturing over EU integration and economic policy. A potential scenario is a ‘soft landing’ where Fidesz retains significant influence through local governance and media control, even without national power—a model seen in Serbia post-2022. Alternatively, a more radical opposition could push for lustration (truth commissions) and EU-enforced judicial reforms, risking backlash from nationalist factions. The EU’s response will determine whether Hungary becomes a cautionary tale or a testing ground for post-liberal democratic resilience.

Roma communities, who make up 8-10% of Hungary’s population, have faced systematic exclusion under Orbán, from segregated schools to the criminalisation of homelessness, yet their perspectives are absent in mainstream narratives. LGBTQ+ activists report increased violence and legal discrimination, with Orbán’s 2021 ‘child protection’ law framing queer identities as ‘dangerous’—a narrative that persists despite electoral defeat. Independent journalists like Szabolcs Panyi have documented Fidesz’s use of state capture to silence dissent, but their work is often sidelined in favour of elite-centric analyses. The opposition’s victory offers little immediate relief for these groups, as their issues remain peripheral to the liberal-conservative power struggle.