Sudan’s military elite consolidates power through Gulf alliances amid civilian exclusion and regional proxy dynamics

Sudanese indigenous governance systems, such as the *Tawila* peace councils in Darfur or the *Fur* and *Masalit* traditional leadership structures, have historically resolved conflicts without military intervention, yet these are systematically excluded from elite negotiations. The 2019 revolution drew strength from indigenous feminist movements like *Manasat*, which framed democracy as a return to pre-colonial communal values. Saudi and Emirati actors dismiss these traditions as 'backward,' reinforcing a neocolonial hierarchy in peacebuilding.

Sudan’s military has been a proxy force for external powers since the Ottoman-Egyptian conquest (1820–1885), later serving British colonial interests through the *Sudan Defence Force*. The 1989 Islamist coup, backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, laid the foundation for today’s military-Islamist alliance, which Gulf states now exploit to counter Iranian influence. The 2019 revolution’s collapse into military rule mirrors post-colonial patterns where external patrons prop up authoritarian regimes to secure access to gold, agriculture, and strategic ports.

Gulf states’ approach to Sudan mirrors their interventions in Yemen and Libya, where military alliances are framed as 'stability operations' while civilian suffering is depoliticized. In contrast, West African juntas like Niger’s have rejected French influence by pivoting to Gulf and Russian patronage, revealing a broader shift in African geopolitics. Indigenous Sudanese and Yemeni peace traditions, such as the *Sulha* mediation process, emphasize communal reconciliation over elite bargaining—a model systematically sidelined by Gulf-backed regimes.

Research on military-civilian transitions (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) shows that external military patronage prolongs conflicts by reducing the cost of repression for juntas. Gulf states’ funding of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) aligns with patterns of 'proxy warfare' documented in Syria and Yemen, where external actors sustain conflict economies. The militarization of Sudan’s economy—controlling 80% of gold exports and 60% of arable land—mirrors resource-curse dynamics in DRC and Angola, where elites extract wealth while civilians face displacement.

Sudanese artists like *Al-Saddig Wugud* and *Ramy Essam* have used music and poetry to critique military rule, framing resistance as a spiritual and cultural act against foreign-backed oppression. The *Darfur famine songs* of the 2000s linked environmental degradation to colonial extraction, a theme echoed in contemporary Gulf-funded land grabs. Saudi Wahhabi influence in Sudan has suppressed Sufi traditions, which historically blended Islamic and indigenous spiritual practices, further eroding communal resilience.

If current trends persist, Sudan will become a permanent 'failed state' proxy battleground, with Gulf states competing for control of the Red Sea’s strategic chokepoints. A potential scenario involves a Saudi-Emirati split, where Riyadh backs Burhan while Abu Dhabi supports the RSF, escalating into a regional conflict involving Egypt and Ethiopia. Alternative futures require dismantling the military’s economic monopolies and investing in federalized, community-led governance structures.

Women-led resistance networks like *No to Oppression Against Women* have been targeted by both the military and RSF, yet their demands for civilian rule are ignored in elite negotiations. Displaced communities in Darfur and Blue Nile, who have lived under siege for decades, are treated as 'humanitarian cases' rather than political actors with solutions. Sudanese diaspora groups, particularly in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, face deportation for organizing pro-democracy campaigns, highlighting the transnational suppression of marginalized voices.