Myanmar’s military junta institutionalizes dictatorship amid ASEAN’s complicity and global inaction

The junta’s rule is built on the suppression of indigenous ethnic groups, including the Karen, Kachin, and Shan, whose territories are rich in natural resources targeted for extraction. Indigenous resistance movements, such as the Karen National Union, have waged guerrilla warfare for decades, but their struggles are often framed as 'insurgencies' rather than legitimate struggles for self-determination. Traditional Karen governance systems, which emphasize communal land rights and rotational leadership, stand in stark contrast to the junta’s centralized, extractive model of governance.

Myanmar’s military has ruled directly or indirectly since the 1962 coup led by Ne Win, which overthrew a democratically elected government and established a socialist dictatorship. The 1988 pro-democracy uprising, which saw thousands killed, was followed by the 2008 constitutional referendum that enshrined military control, setting the stage for the 2021 coup. The junta’s current leader, Min Aung Hlaing, is a product of this system, having risen through the ranks during the brutal suppression of ethnic minorities in the 1990s and 2000s.

In Thailand, the military has also played a dominant role in politics, with coups in 2006 and 2014 justified as necessary to restore order, echoing Myanmar’s narrative of military guardianship. The Buddhist concept of 'dhamma' (moral law) is often invoked by both Thai and Myanmar militaries to legitimize their rule, framing dissent as a violation of societal harmony. However, in Cambodia, the legacy of the Khmer Rouge has led to a more skeptical view of military rule, with civil society and indigenous groups actively resisting authoritarianism.

Studies on authoritarian resilience in Myanmar highlight the junta’s use of divide-and-rule tactics, co-opting ethnic armed groups through ceasefire agreements while suppressing others, a strategy documented in research by the International Crisis Group. The junta’s economic model relies on resource extraction, with Myanmar’s jade and gemstone industries linked to systemic corruption and environmental degradation, as shown in reports by Global Witness. The military’s control over the economy is also analyzed in academic work on 'military capitalism,' which demonstrates how armed forces in post-colonial states often become economic actors.

Burmese artists and filmmakers, such as Min Hlaing Oo and Midi Z, have used their work to critique the junta, with films like 'The Monk' and 'The Road to Mandalay' exposing the violence of military rule. Traditional Burmese theater, such as 'Yoke thé' (marionette theater), has historically been used to subtly critique power, though censorship under the junta has forced artists to use allegory and metaphor. Buddhist monks, particularly in the 2007 Saffron Revolution, have played a pivotal role in protests, framing resistance as a moral duty rooted in the teachings of the Buddha.

Scenario modeling by the International Crisis Group suggests that without international pressure targeting the junta’s economic lifelines, Myanmar could face decades of prolonged conflict, with ethnic armed groups fragmenting into warlordism. The junta’s reliance on China and Russia for arms and diplomatic cover means that a shift in global power dynamics could either embolden or weaken its grip on power. Future stability in Myanmar may depend on the ability of pro-democracy forces to unify ethnic armed groups, civil society, and diaspora communities under a shared vision of federal democracy.

Ethnic minority women, such as those from the Karen and Kachin communities, have borne the brunt of the junta’s violence, facing sexual violence, forced displacement, and labor exploitation, yet their stories are rarely centered in international coverage. The Rohingya crisis, which saw over 700,000 flee to Bangladesh in 2017, is often framed as a 'humanitarian emergency' rather than a genocide enabled by the junta’s policies of apartheid and persecution. Diaspora communities, including Burmese refugees in Thailand and Malaysia, have organized resistance networks but are often excluded from formal peace negotiations.