Nepal’s democratic backsliding: PM Shah’s centralised governance erodes institutional checks amid rapid policy shifts

Indigenous Nepali communities, particularly the Janajati groups like the Tamang and Gurung, have long resisted Kathmandu’s assimilationist policies, viewing federalism as a means to preserve linguistic and land rights. Shah’s centralisation directly threatens these gains, as his ‘efficient governance’ rhetoric mirrors historical Nepali state efforts to suppress Indigenous autonomy, such as the 1990s ‘one nation, one language’ campaigns. The absence of Indigenous consultation in policy shifts reflects a colonial-era pattern of decision-making that excludes those most affected by governance changes.

Nepal’s current crisis echoes the 1960s Panchayat system, where King Mahendra justified authoritarian rule as ‘stability’ against ‘chaos,’ much like Shah’s framing of ‘efficiency’ versus ‘obstruction.’ The 2015 federal transition, meant to decentralise power, has instead created a power vacuum exploited by Kathmandu’s elite. Regional parallels abound: Sri Lanka’s 1972 constitutional coup and Bangladesh’s 1988 one-party rule show how ‘rapid governance’ often precedes democratic collapse, with courts and media complicit in legitimising overreach.

In Bhutan, ‘Gross National Happiness’ governance prioritises collective well-being over GDP growth, a model Nepal’s Shah dismisses as ‘inefficient.’ Across Southeast Asia, leaders like Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew used ‘strongman’ tactics to justify rapid development, but at the cost of civil liberties—a path Nepal may be treading. Indigenous Māori governance in Aotearoa/New Zealand, by contrast, embeds checks and balances through treaty obligations, offering a framework Nepal’s federalism could emulate.

Political science research on ‘democratic backsliding’ (e.g., Levitsky & Ziblatt) highlights how executives exploit crises to weaken institutions, a pattern evident in Nepal’s judiciary’s muted response to Shah’s arrests. Studies on federalism (e.g., Stepan) show that without robust revenue-sharing and local autonomy, decentralisation fails—Nepal’s federal experiment suffers from both. The ‘efficiency vs. democracy’ trade-off is empirically unsupported; research (e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson) shows long-term stability requires inclusive institutions, not centralised control.

Nepali folk traditions, like the *Dhimal* community’s oral histories, frame leadership as a sacred duty to the land and people, not a managerial task. Shah’s technocratic rhetoric clashes with spiritual values of *dharma* (moral duty), where governance must balance power with compassion. The rapid arrests evoke the *Rana regime*’s repression, which artists like Laxmi Prasad Devkota critiqued in poems like *Muna Madan*—a warning Nepal risks ignoring.

Scenario modelling by Nepal’s *Centre for Social Research and Development* predicts that if Shah’s centralisation continues, Nepal could face a 2027 constitutional crisis, with federal provinces declaring autonomy. Comparative cases (e.g., Myanmar’s 2021 coup) suggest that rapid policy shifts without institutional buy-in lead to prolonged instability. A ‘managed federalism’ model, as proposed by the *Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities*, could mitigate risks by devolving power to local councils with veto rights over land and resource policies.

Dalit activists, who face systemic exclusion from governance, warn that Shah’s arrests target opposition leaders from marginalised castes, reinforcing historic hierarchies. Madhesi women leaders, like rights advocate Sarita Giri, argue that federalism’s failure to address citizenship discrimination (e.g., the 2006 citizenship laws) fuels separatist sentiments. Indigenous journalists, such as those at *Hamro Patro*, document state repression but are sidelined by mainstream media, which frames dissent as ‘obstruction.’