Kuwait’s critical infrastructure under drone threat exposes regional proxy warfare and Iran’s geopolitical balancing act amid unchecked militarization

Gulf indigenous knowledge systems, rooted in Bedouin traditions of *‘urf* (customary law) and *hikma* (wisdom), emphasize conflict resolution through tribal mediation rather than militarized deterrence. The modern state’s reliance on drone warfare disrupts these ancestral practices, replacing face-to-face diplomacy with remote, dehumanized violence. Additionally, the concept of *‘adl* (justice) in Islamic jurisprudence requires proportional responses to aggression, a principle often ignored in the current securitization narrative.

The use of drones in asymmetric warfare traces back to the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, where both sides deployed rudimentary UAVs for surveillance and strikes, a precursor to today’s precision attacks. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq further normalized drone warfare, with the CIA and Pentagon later exporting these tactics to Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who now deploy them in Yemen. Kuwait’s own history of Iraqi invasion in 1990 underscores its vulnerability to hybrid warfare, yet its military modernization has paradoxically increased its exposure to drone threats.

In Latin America, drone strikes by cartels (e.g., in Mexico) have led to civilian casualties and forced displacement, mirroring Gulf patterns where non-state actors exploit state weaknesses. African conflicts, such as in Somalia, show how drone proliferation by external powers (U.S., Turkey) has destabilized local governance without addressing root causes like poverty or clan rivalries. Meanwhile, in South Asia, India’s use of drones in Kashmir has been condemned by Pakistani and Kashmiri activists as a form of state terrorism, drawing parallels to Gulf narratives of ‘plausible deniability.’

Drone technology has evolved from military-grade systems to commercially available quadcopters, with payload capacities increasing from 1kg to over 20kg in under a decade. The proliferation of 3D-printed components and open-source flight controllers (e.g., ArduPilot) has democratized drone manufacturing, enabling non-state actors to conduct precision strikes at minimal cost. However, the lack of international regulations on drone swarming and AI-enabled targeting raises risks of unintended escalation, as seen in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Artists in the Gulf, such as Kuwaiti painter Thuraya Al-Baqsami, have depicted drones as symbols of alienation and surveillance, reflecting societal anxieties about dehumanized warfare. Iranian cinema (e.g., *The Glass Agency*) often frames drones as extensions of colonial violence, while Saudi artists like Ahmed Mater critique the militarization of sacred spaces through drone imagery. In Sufi traditions, the drone’s persistent hum is likened to the *nafs* (lower self), a metaphor for the insatiable appetite for power that drives modern conflicts.

Scenario modeling by the RAND Corporation suggests that unchecked drone proliferation in the Gulf could lead to a ‘drone arms race’ by 2030, with non-state actors deploying swarm tactics to overwhelm air defenses. Climate change exacerbates this risk, as water scarcity and food insecurity may drive militant groups to target desalination plants and agricultural infrastructure. Meanwhile, AI-enabled drones could enable ‘autonomous warfare,’ where machines select targets without human oversight, further destabilizing regional security.

Kuwait’s stateless Bidun community, denied citizenship and basic rights, faces heightened risks during drone strikes due to their concentration in industrial zones near critical infrastructure. Migrant laborers, who comprise 70% of Kuwait’s workforce, are often excluded from emergency response plans and lack access to shelters or medical care during attacks. Iranian women’s rights activists argue that drone strikes distract from domestic repression, while Kurdish groups in Iran and Iraq view such incidents as part of a broader campaign to suppress ethnic minorities.