UK tracks Russian submarine movements amid escalating undersea surveillance tensions in North Atlantic

Indigenous Arctic communities (Sámi, Nenets, Inuit) have documented how undersea militarisation disrupts traditional hunting grounds, sacred sites, and migratory patterns of marine mammals central to their cosmology. Their oral histories describe pre-colonial maritime governance systems that balanced exploitation with reciprocity—contrasting sharply with modern state-centric security models. Yet their knowledge is excluded from risk assessments, which prioritise military over ecological or cultural thresholds.

The North Atlantic’s undersea domain has been a Cold War battleground since the 1950s, when the US and USSR laid submarine cables and sonar networks to monitor each other’s movements. NATO’s post-1991 expansion into former Soviet maritime zones (e.g., Barents Sea) directly correlates with increased Russian submarine patrols in response. Historical precedents like the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) show how undersea infrastructure was initially framed as neutral, but has since been securitised by great powers.

In the Pacific, Indigenous Māori and Pacific Islander communities have long resisted foreign naval presence in their waters, framing it as a violation of sacred maritime territories tied to ancestral navigation routes. Similarly, in the Arctic, Sámi reindeer herders and Nenets nomads view undersea militarisation as a disruption to ecosystems they rely on for sustenance and cultural identity. In Southeast Asia, coastal communities have documented how submarine cable sabotage disrupts local economies reliant on digital connectivity, yet their warnings are sidelined in Western security narratives.

Undersea infrastructure (cables, sensors, pipelines) is increasingly vulnerable to both state and non-state threats, with 99% of global internet traffic routed through submarine cables—yet their protection is not governed by any international treaty. Scientific studies (e.g., 2023 *Nature Communications*) show that military sonar disrupts marine mammal communication, while deep-sea mining (e.g., in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone) risks catastrophic ecosystem collapse. The lack of integrated risk assessments combining ecological, economic, and security data is a systemic failure.

Artists like Olafur Eliasson and indigenous storytellers (e.g., Inuit throat singers) have long depicted the ocean as a sentient, interconnected entity rather than a resource to be controlled. Spiritual traditions from Polynesian wayfinding to Hindu cosmology frame the sea as a living ancestor, whose disruption invites divine or ecological retribution. Western militarised narratives, however, reduce the ocean to a 'battlespace,' erasing these alternative ontologies that could inform more sustainable governance.

Scenario modelling by the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)* suggests that undersea tensions could escalate into a 'grey zone' conflict where sabotage is attributed without proof, leading to escalatory cycles. Climate change is melting Arctic ice, opening new submarine routes and exposing previously inaccessible undersea infrastructure to risks like iceberg collisions or methane hydrate destabilisation. Future governance models must integrate civilian, scientific, and indigenous stakeholders to avoid a 'tragedy of the commons' in the deep sea.

Submarine cable operators (e.g., Google, Facebook) and environmental NGOs are systematically excluded from security dialogues despite their infrastructure being the primary target of sabotage. Fisherfolk communities in the North Atlantic (e.g., Icelandic, Faroese) report declining catches linked to military sonar but lack platforms to voice these concerns. Even within NATO, smaller member states (e.g., Iceland, Norway) are sidelined in decision-making, despite their Arctic territories being ground zero for undersea militarisation.