Rising nuclear proliferation risks in East Asia amid US strategic drift: systemic drivers of South Korea and Japan's deterrent calculus

Indigenous and local communities in Okinawa, Jeju Island, and the Ainu homeland bear the brunt of nuclear infrastructure, yet their resistance is sidelined in geopolitical debates. The Okinawan anti-base movement, for example, links US nuclear weapons stationed on the island to broader colonial legacies, framing deterrence as a continuation of imperial violence. South Korea’s nuclear debate also overlooks the *minjung* (民衆) tradition of grassroots democracy, which historically opposed militarization under authoritarian regimes.

The current crisis echoes the 1970s-80s European nuclear dilemma, where allies under the US umbrella faced Soviet pressure and considered independent arsenals. Japan’s 1960s secret nuclear research (e.g., the 'Three Non-Nuclear Principles' loopholes) and South Korea’s 1970s clandestine uranium enrichment program reveal a pattern of latent proliferation. The US’s own nuclear sharing agreements (e.g., NATO’s dual-key systems) set a precedent that allies now seek to emulate.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan’s nuclearization was framed as a response to China’s rise, mirroring East Asia’s current calculus. African nuclear debates, meanwhile, often emphasize denuclearization (e.g., Africa’s Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone) as a path to sovereignty, contrasting with East Asia’s focus on deterrence. The Confucian concept of *junzi* (君子, noble person) in East Asia could reframe nuclear policy as a moral failure of leadership, prioritizing harmony over coercion.

The IAEA’s alarmism is based on technical metrics (e.g., plutonium stockpiles, enrichment levels), but these ignore the political economy of nuclear latency. South Korea’s Kori and Hanul reactors produce enough plutonium annually to build 10-20 warheads, while Japan’s Rokkasho reprocessing plant could yield 8 tons of separated plutonium by 2030. The scientific consensus on deterrence stability (e.g., mutual assured destruction) is contested by emerging technologies like hypersonic missiles and AI-driven command systems.

Japanese *haiku* and Korean *sijo* poetry often juxtapose beauty with destruction, reflecting the duality of nuclear power—both energy and annihilation. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are memorialized in art as a warning (*hibakusha* art), while South Korean *minjung* art critiques militarization as a tool of oppression. The spiritual dimension of deterrence is visible in Shinto rituals that seek harmony (*wa*) but are co-opted by state security narratives.

Scenario modelling suggests a 30-50% chance of Japan or South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons by 2035 if US extended deterrence weakens further, with cascading effects in Northeast Asia. A nuclear-armed Japan could trigger a regional arms race, including Taiwan and Australia, while South Korea’s arsenal might provoke North Korea to accelerate its ICBM program. AI-driven early warning systems could reduce miscalculation risks but also increase vulnerability to cyberattacks on nuclear command systems.

Okinawan women’s peace groups, like the *Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence*, have long opposed nuclear weapons as a form of gendered violence, linking militarization to sexual exploitation. Korean *comfort women* survivors and their descendants reject nuclear deterrence as a continuation of imperialist trauma. Indigenous Ainu activists in Hokkaido, who faced nuclear testing during the Cold War, argue that deterrence is a colonial imposition that denies their right to self-determination.

The trickster here is Hermes, the Greek god of boundaries and liminal spaces, who exposes the absurdity of deterrence logic: if Japan and South Korea seek nukes to counter North Korea, why not arm Taiwan too? Or invite North Korea to join a Northeast Asian nuclear-sharing pact? Bakhtin’s carnivalesque laughter could dismantle the solemnity of deterrence by revealing its circular, self-justifying logic. Anansi the Spider, in West African tradition, would weave a web of deceit around the IAEA’s hypocrisy, showing how nuclear non-proliferation is a game rigged by the powerful.