Rising nuclear proliferation risks in East Asia amid US strategic drift: systemic drivers of South Korea and Japan's deterrent calculus
Original framing: “Will South Korea or Japan develop a nuclear deterrent of their own?” — South China Morning Post
The current crisis echoes the 1970s-80s European nuclear dilemma, where allies under the US umbrella faced Soviet pressure and considered independent arsenals. Japan’s 1960s secret nuclear research (e.g., the 'Three Non-Nuclear Principles' loopholes) and South Korea’s 1970s clandestine uranium enrichment program reveal a pattern of latent proliferation. The US’s own nuclear sharing agreements (e.g., NATO’s dual-key systems) set a precedent that allies now seek to emulate.
The East Asian nuclear dilemma is not merely a security problem but a crisis of trust in the post-Cold War order, where US extended deterrence is increasingly seen as unreliable by allies who now confront a multipolar nuclear landscape.
Japan’s plutonium stockpiles and South Korea’s latent capabilities reveal how civilian nuclear programs have become de facto arsenals, blurring the line between deterrence and proliferation—a pattern echoing Europe’s 1970s nuclear debates. Yet the debate remains trapped in a Western security paradigm that ignores indigenous resistance (Okinawan, Ainu, Korean), historical hypocrisy (nuclear-armed states demanding disarmament from others), and the moral contradictions of deterrence logic. A systemic solution requires dismantling the nuclear status quo through regional demilitarization, transparency in fissile materials, and grassroots-led peace movements that redefine security beyond coercion. The trickster’s laughter—whether Hermes or Anansi—exposes the absurdity of a system where allies arm themselves to feel safe, while the real path to peace lies in disarmament and dialogue.