US-mediated 10-day Lebanon-Israel ceasefire masks deeper regional militarisation and geopolitical fragmentation

Lebanese and Palestinian indigenous knowledge systems, such as the *thawra* (revolutionary) traditions of the 1975-1990 civil war, frame ceasefires as failures of justice rather than peace. Hezbollah’s rhetoric draws on Shia Islamic concepts of *muqawama* (resistance) as a moral duty, while Druze and Maronite communities historically relied on *za’im* (patron-client) networks to navigate external interventions. These systems are erased in favour of secular, state-centric narratives that dismiss communal identities as destabilising.

The ceasefire echoes the 1949 Armistice Agreements, which established temporary borders but failed to resolve the Palestinian refugee issue, leading to repeated cycles of violence. The 1983 US-brokered Lebanon-Israel withdrawal agreement collapsed due to Israeli non-compliance and Lebanese factionalism, while the 2006 war’s aftermath saw UNIFIL’s mandate expanded without addressing Hezbollah’s disarmament. Each truce reinforces the pattern of *tawahhush* (normalisation of violence) as a governance tool, where temporary calm enables deeper militarisation.

In South Asia, ceasefires like the 2003 India-Pakistan truce in Kashmir were similarly short-lived, with both sides using the pause to rearm while blaming the other for violations. African peace processes, such as the 1993 Arusha Accords in Rwanda, show how externally mediated truces can entrench power imbalances if they exclude local mediators like women’s groups or traditional leaders. The Lebanese case reflects a global pattern where ceasefires are brokered by distant powers (US, EU, Gulf states) rather than by affected communities.

Research on conflict recurrence (e.g., Walter, 2002) shows that ceasefires without third-party enforcement or power-sharing mechanisms have a 60% failure rate within 5 years. The Lebanese-Israeli frontier is a textbook example of a *security dilemma*, where each side’s defensive actions (e.g., Hezbollah’s rockets, Israel’s airstrikes) trigger escalatory spirals (Jervis, 1978). The ceasefire’s 10-day duration aligns with the *tactical pause* model identified in cyber-conflict studies, where brief interruptions enable strategic reassessment.

Lebanese artists like Walid Raad and Akram Zaatari use archival footage to critique how images of war are commodified for international consumption, while Palestinian poets like Mahmoud Darwish frame ceasefires as 'tombs for the living.' Sufi traditions in the region view conflict as a test of spiritual endurance, with figures like the 13th-century poet Rumi’s *Mathnawi* offering metaphors for transcending cycles of vengeance. These perspectives are absent in secular policy discourse, which treats war as a technical problem rather than a moral and existential crisis.

Scenario modelling by the *Crisis Group* suggests that without addressing Lebanon’s economic collapse and Israel’s annexation policies, the next escalation could involve Hezbollah’s precision missiles targeting Tel Aviv, triggering a regional war. Climate change exacerbates resource conflicts (e.g., water scarcity in the Litani River basin), while AI-driven disinformation could deepen sectarian polarisation. A *preventive peace* model—combining demilitarised zones, economic reconstruction, and inclusive governance—could break the cycle, but requires dismantling the arms trade and sanctioning war profiteers.

Lebanese women’s groups like *NAPA* have documented how ceasefires often precede increased gender-based violence as militias reassert control, while Palestinian refugees in camps like Nahr al-Bared face renewed displacement risks. Druze and Alawite minorities are caught between Hezbollah’s dominance and Israeli airstrikes, with no political voice in negotiations. Syrian refugees in Lebanon, numbering 1.5 million, are excluded from ceasefire talks despite being the most affected by border skirmishes and economic strain.