China’s Taiwan policy shifts reflect systemic power struggles, not goodwill, amid geopolitical tensions

Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, comprising 2.3% of the population, have long been marginalized in both Chinese and Taiwanese nationalist narratives, which frame them as either ‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘compatriots.’ Their traditional lands, particularly in the mountainous regions, are often treated as strategic buffers in cross-strait tensions, ignoring their stewardship and sovereignty claims. Indigenous activists have repeatedly called for recognition of their right to self-determination, separate from both Beijing’s ‘One China’ principle and Taipei’s assimilationist policies. Their exclusion from mainstream discourse reflects a broader pattern of erasure in geopolitical conflicts.

The cross-strait conflict is rooted in the 1949 division of China, where the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War, establishing a government that claimed legitimacy over all of China. The 1979 U.S.-China rapprochement and the U.S. shift in recognizing Beijing over Taipei further entrenched the conflict, with Taiwan’s international isolation deepening over decades. Beijing’s ‘goodwill’ gestures, such as economic incentives, are often cyclical and tied to moments of perceived Taiwanese defiance, as seen during the 2016-2020 Tsai Ing-wen administration. Historical parallels include the Soviet Union’s use of economic leverage to influence Eastern Bloc states during the Cold War.

In the Pacific Islands, sovereignty is often framed through relational rather than territorial lenses, where land is tied to ancestral ties and communal governance—contrasting with China’s state-centric approach to ‘reunification.’ The Māori concept of *tino rangatiratanga* (absolute sovereignty) in Aotearoa/New Zealand offers a model for Indigenous self-determination that challenges both colonial and post-colonial state narratives. Meanwhile, in Africa, post-colonial states have grappled with similar tensions between national unity and ethnic diversity, often leading to protracted conflicts when external powers impose unitary models. These cross-cultural perspectives highlight the limitations of binary frameworks like ‘unification vs. independence.’

Academic research on conflict resolution emphasizes the role of asymmetric power dynamics in shaping negotiation outcomes, where the stronger party (China) can offer ‘concessions’ that are easily revoked, reinforcing dependency rather than trust. Studies on coercive diplomacy (e.g., George and Simons, 1994) show that such tactics often backfire, increasing resistance rather than compliance. Meanwhile, game theory models of the cross-strait relationship reveal that both sides operate under a ‘security dilemma,’ where actions perceived as defensive by one party are seen as aggressive by the other. The lack of third-party mediation (e.g., ASEAN or the UN) further exacerbates the risk of escalation.

Artistic expressions from Taiwan, such as the 2019 documentary *Island Etude*, depict the island’s cultural identity as a tapestry of Indigenous, Hakka, and Minnan influences, resisting homogenizing narratives from Beijing and Taipei. In Taiwanese literature, works like *The Butcher’s Wife* by Li Ang critique the violence of patriarchal and state power, drawing parallels to the structural oppression in cross-strait relations. Meanwhile, Chinese state propaganda often employs spiritual and cultural motifs (e.g., the ‘Chinese Dream’) to frame reunification as a moral imperative, obscuring the diversity of Taiwanese identities. These artistic and spiritual dimensions reveal the deep cultural schisms that political narratives often ignore.

Scenario planning by think tanks like the International Crisis Group suggests that China’s ‘goodwill’ tactics may escalate if Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) consolidates power, leading to a potential blockade or military confrontation. Models from the RAND Corporation indicate that economic decoupling could trigger a regional financial crisis, disproportionately affecting Taiwan’s semiconductor-dependent economy. Meanwhile, climate change exacerbates resource competition in the South China Sea, adding another layer of complexity to cross-strait tensions. Future models must account for the role of non-state actors, such as Taiwanese civil society and Indigenous groups, whose agency is often overlooked in geopolitical forecasts.

Marginalised voices in Taiwan include not only Indigenous groups but also the ‘New Immigrants’ (mostly women from Southeast Asia married to Taiwanese men), who face systemic discrimination and are often excluded from political discourse. Pro-independence activists, particularly youth and students, are frequently labeled as ‘radicals’ in mainstream media, despite their growing influence in shaping Taiwan’s identity. Meanwhile, the ‘White Terror’ generation—those who suffered under KMT authoritarianism—often view China’s ‘goodwill’ gestures with deep skepticism, framing them as Trojan horses for assimilation. Their perspectives are systematically sidelined in favor of narratives that prioritize economic or security concerns over democratic values.