Nigerian military’s contested narrative on Kaduna church attack exposes structural failures in counterinsurgency and interfaith security

Indigenous Nigerian peacebuilding traditions, such as the 'Dogon Kurmi' conflict resolution councils in Plateau State or the 'Sarkin Fada' systems in the North, emphasize restorative justice and interfaith dialogue, yet these are sidelined in favor of military solutions. Fulani pastoralists, for example, have their own conflict mediation mechanisms, such as the 'Ardo' system, which could be integrated into state security frameworks to address root causes of violence. The erasure of these systems reflects a colonial legacy that undervalues indigenous knowledge in favor of centralized, coercive governance.

Nigeria’s cycles of religious and ethnic violence trace back to colonial divide-and-rule policies, which institutionalized ethnic and religious divisions to maintain control, and post-independence failures to reconcile these tensions through federalism. The 1966 counter-coup and subsequent civil war set a precedent for military intervention in political disputes, normalizing the use of force over dialogue. The Biafra War (1967–1970) and subsequent communal clashes, such as the 1992 Zango-Kataf riots, reveal a pattern of state failure to protect civilians, which persists in the Kaduna case.

Comparative analysis shows that countries like Rwanda and South Africa have grappled with post-conflict reconciliation through truth and reconciliation commissions, offering a model for Nigeria to address historical grievances and rebuild trust. In Kenya, the 'Kikuyu-Maasai Peace Accords' of the 2000s demonstrate how traditional leaders can broker interethnic agreements, a model Nigeria could adapt. The Ethiopian 'Gadaa' system, a democratic governance model among the Oromo people, highlights the potential of indigenous institutions to mediate modern conflicts.

Research from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shows that Nigeria’s violence is increasingly driven by competition over resources, particularly in the Middle Belt, rather than purely religious or ethnic motives. Studies on counterinsurgency, such as those by the Small Arms Survey, indicate that military-led approaches often exacerbate civilian casualties and fuel recruitment into armed groups. Climate data from the IPCC links the expansion of Fulani herder-farmer conflicts to desertification and erratic rainfall, underscoring the need for climate-adaptive policies.

Artistic expressions, such as the 'Hausa praise poetry' or 'Igbo masquerade traditions,' often encode messages of peace and reconciliation, serving as informal conflict mediation tools in communities. Nigerian filmmakers like Tunde Kelani have used Nollywood to explore interfaith tensions, such as in 'Abeni' (2006), which critiques state failure while offering spiritual solutions. The role of Pentecostal and Islamic charismatic movements in Nigeria, which blend spiritual and political messaging, also shapes public perceptions of violence and security.

Scenario modeling by the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) suggests that without structural reforms, Nigeria could face increased fragmentation, with regional militias gaining more influence and the military becoming further entrenched in politics. Climate projections indicate that by 2050, the Sahel region will experience more frequent droughts, likely intensifying herder-farmer conflicts and displacement, necessitating adaptive governance. Alternative futures include the rise of community-led security initiatives, such as Nigeria’s 'Civilian Joint Task Force' in Borno, which could be scaled with proper support.

Women’s groups in northern Nigeria, such as the 'Women for Peace and Security Network,' have long advocated for disarmament and dialogue but are excluded from high-level security discussions. Fulani herders, often stereotyped as aggressors, are rarely given platforms to articulate their grievances or propose solutions, despite their deep knowledge of land use and conflict dynamics. Christian and Muslim youth leaders, who are often at the forefront of grassroots peacebuilding, are sidelined in favor of institutional actors who prioritize military solutions.