Iran’s power elite: How structural factionalism and elite consensus enable state violence against dissent

Iran’s political system is rooted in a theocratic-military hybrid that marginalizes indigenous and non-Persian identities, such as the Ahwazi Arabs, Kurds, and Baloch, who face systemic discrimination and violent suppression. The velayat-e faqih system, while framed as a return to ‘authentic’ Islamic governance, is a modern construct that erases pre-Islamic Persian and tribal traditions, replacing them with a centralized, Persian-dominated state. Indigenous knowledge systems, such as those of the Baloch, who historically resisted both Persian and British colonial rule, are systematically excluded from political participation, reducing their agency to armed resistance or cultural preservation.

Iran’s factionalized elite is a direct legacy of the 1979 revolution, where power was divided between clerics, military factions, and technocrats under the guise of ‘Islamic democracy.’ The 2009 Green Movement protests and their violent suppression set a precedent for the January 2024 crackdown, revealing a cyclical pattern where elite infighting is resolved through collective repression. Historical parallels exist in other revolutionary states, such as Cuba’s post-1959 purges or Algeria’s 1990s civil war, where internal dissent is framed as a threat to ‘revolutionary unity.’ The 1953 CIA-MI6 coup against Mossadegh, which installed the Shah, also created a lasting trauma that elites exploit to justify authoritarianism as ‘anti-imperialist.’

Across the Global South, revolutionary elites often use ‘anti-imperialist’ rhetoric to justify authoritarianism, a pattern seen in Venezuela’s Chavismo, Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF, and Turkey’s AKP. In Iran, this rhetoric is weaponized to suppress dissent by framing protests as ‘foreign plots,’ a tactic mirrored in China’s ‘color revolution’ narratives or Russia’s justification for invading Ukraine. Non-Western critiques of state violence, such as those from Iranian Marxist feminists or Kurdish anarchists, challenge the binary of ‘moderate vs. hardliner’ by exposing the shared material interests of all factions in maintaining the status quo.

Political science research on authoritarian resilience highlights how factionalized elites maintain power through ‘competitive authoritarianism,’ where controlled elections and selective repression create the illusion of pluralism while preserving elite dominance. Studies on protest movements (e.g., Tilly’s ‘repertoires of contention’) show that state violence is most effective when it is institutionalized and predictable, as in Iran’s use of the Revolutionary Guard’s Basij forces. The January 2024 crackdown aligns with global trends in digital repression, where surveillance and internet shutdowns are used to preemptively crush dissent, as documented by organizations like the Citizen Lab.

Iranian art and literature, from Forugh Farrokhzad’s poetry to Abbas Kiarostami’s films, have long depicted the tension between individual agency and state control, framing dissent as a spiritual and artistic act of defiance. The ‘White Wednesdays’ movement, where women publicly remove their hijabs, blends feminist activism with Islamic symbolism, creating a spiritual resistance that transcends secular-left binaries. Sufi traditions, which emphasize inner freedom and critique of dogma, have historically been suppressed by Iran’s clerical establishment, yet their themes of resistance persist in underground music and poetry.

Scenario modelling suggests that Iran’s current trajectory—where elite infighting is resolved through repression—will lead to either a managed transition (e.g., controlled liberalization under a new figurehead) or a collapse into further fragmentation, with regional proxies (e.g., IRGC-backed militias) gaining autonomy. The rise of digital dissent tools, such as mesh networks and encrypted apps, could erode the state’s monopoly on information, but only if accompanied by international support for civil society. A ‘soft landing’ scenario would require elite defections, as seen in the 1989 Soviet collapse, but Iran’s Revolutionary Guard’s economic dominance makes this unlikely without external pressure.

Iran’s marginalized groups—women, ethnic minorities, and leftist activists—are systematically excluded from elite narratives, with their protests criminalized as ‘sedition’ or ‘foreign interference.’ The January 2024 crackdown disproportionately targeted Kurdish and Baloch regions, where dissent is framed as ‘terrorism,’ reflecting a broader pattern of state violence against non-Persian identities. Iranian feminists and labor organizers, such as the ‘Women’s Committee of the Haft Tappeh Sugarcane Workers,’ challenge the elite consensus by linking economic justice to gender liberation, but their voices are suppressed by both ‘reformist’ and ‘hardliner’ factions.