Mainstream coverage frames ASEAN's diplomatic positioning as a matter of short-term opportunism, but this overlooks the systemic pressures of great power competition and the region's historical role as a geopolitical buffer. Zheng Yongnian's warning reflects China's desire to maintain strategic autonomy while preventing ASEAN from deepening ties with the US. The framing ignores ASEAN's own institutional limitations in managing complex multilateral relationships and the structural incentives that drive smaller states to hedge between superpowers.
This narrative is produced by a Chinese academic aligned with Beijing's strategic interests and disseminated through a pro-China media outlet. It serves to reinforce China's position as a stabilizing force in the region while obscuring the broader geopolitical dynamics that shape ASEAN's foreign policy. The framing downplays the agency of ASEAN states and the structural forces that compel them to balance between competing powers.
Eight knowledge lenses applied to this story by the Cogniosynthetic Corrective Engine.
Southeast Asian states have long employed indigenous diplomatic strategies to navigate external pressures, including the Siamese tradition of balancing between colonial powers. These practices are often overlooked in favor of Western-centric models of international relations.
ASEAN's current balancing act mirrors its Cold War-era non-alignment strategy, where states sought to avoid entanglement in the US-Soviet rivalry. Historical parallels show that such strategies are often driven by structural necessity rather than opportunism.
In many non-Western diplomatic traditions, including those of Southeast Asia, balancing between great powers is a recognized and legitimate strategy for preserving sovereignty. This contrasts with Western liberal internationalist narratives that often frame such behavior as opportunistic.
Systemic analysis of international relations theory, particularly realist and constructivist frameworks, supports the notion that smaller states often adopt balancing strategies in response to great power competition. Empirical studies confirm the structural incentives for such behavior.
The ASEAN balancing act can be seen through a metaphorical lens as a dance between two tigers, where each step must be carefully calculated to avoid provoking either. This reflects a spiritual and philosophical approach to diplomacy found in many Southeast Asian cultures.
Future scenarios suggest that ASEAN's continued hedging may lead to increased regional instability if great power competition escalates. Alternatively, a more integrated ASEAN could emerge as a counterweight to both China and the US, though this requires significant institutional strengthening.
ASEAN member states, particularly smaller ones like Cambodia and Laos, have limited agency in the China-US rivalry. Their perspectives are often marginalized in favor of dominant narratives from Beijing and Washington, despite their strategic importance in the region.
The original framing omits the historical precedent of ASEAN's non-alignment during the Cold War, the role of indigenous diplomatic traditions in Southeast Asia, and the structural constraints faced by smaller states in a bipolar system. It also neglects the perspectives of ASEAN member states and the broader implications of great power competition on regional security and development.
An ACST audit of what the original framing omits. Eligible for cross-reference under the ACST vocabulary.
ASEAN needs to deepen its institutional capacity to manage multilateral relations independently. This includes enhancing the ASEAN Secretariat, improving coordination mechanisms, and building consensus on shared strategic interests. Strengthening ASEAN's role as a regional actor can reduce dependency on external powers.
Expanding and institutionalizing multilateral dialogue platforms such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Plus Three can provide a structured space for managing China-US tensions. These forums should prioritize inclusive participation and conflict resolution mechanisms that reflect ASEAN's collective interests.
ASEAN should work toward a more inclusive and cooperative regional security architecture that reduces the binary China-US framing. This could involve developing a regional code of conduct for maritime disputes and promoting confidence-building measures among all stakeholders.
Investing in diplomatic training and capacity-building programs for ASEAN officials can enhance their ability to navigate complex geopolitical dynamics. This includes fostering a deeper understanding of international law, conflict resolution, and strategic communication.
ASEAN's balancing act in the China-US rivalry is not merely opportunistic but a systemic response to the structural constraints of great power competition. Drawing on historical precedents and non-Western diplomatic traditions, ASEAN states employ hedging strategies to preserve sovereignty and stability. However, the current institutional limitations of ASEAN hinder its ability to act as a cohesive regional actor. Strengthening ASEAN's institutional capacity, expanding multilateral dialogue, and building regional security mechanisms are essential for navigating the evolving geopolitical landscape. These steps must be grounded in a deeper understanding of indigenous diplomatic practices, historical patterns, and the perspectives of marginalized states within the region.