Benin’s election reveals post-coup stability as elite continuity masks democratic erosion and structural inequality

Benin’s pre-colonial governance systems, such as the *Migan* (judicial) and *Mehu* (executive) roles in the Dahomey Kingdom, institutionalised checks on monarchical power through rotational leadership and council-based decision-making. These systems were disrupted by French colonialism, which imposed centralised bureaucracies that later evolved into the postcolonial state’s authoritarian tendencies. Contemporary Beninese politics could reclaim these principles by decentralising authority to traditional councils, yet this is rarely discussed in electoral analyses.

Benin’s current political economy is a direct legacy of 1980s-90s IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programs, which privatised state enterprises, liberalised trade, and imposed austerity—policies that Talon’s government has deepened through public-private partnerships favoring urban elites. The 2019 constitutional reform limiting presidents to two terms mirrors Togo’s 2002 changes, which allowed Gnassingbé Eyadéma to rule until 2005, and Burkina Faso’s 2015 attempt to extend Blaise Compaoré’s tenure. These patterns reveal a regional trend of elite entrenchment through institutional manipulation.

Across Francophone West Africa, elections often function as 'managed democracies' where opposition is co-opted or suppressed, as in Cameroon’s 2018 polls or Côte d’Ivoire’s 2020 contest where Alassane Ouattara’s third-term bid sparked violence. In contrast, Ghana’s 2000-2008 democratic transition shows that elite pacts can yield stable transitions if accompanied by inclusive economic policies. Benin’s case reflects a broader pattern where 'stability' is prioritised over democratic depth, echoing Singapore’s 1965-1990s developmental authoritarianism.

Political science research on 'electoral authoritarianism' (Levitsky & Way, 2010) demonstrates how regimes use elections to legitimise power while suppressing dissent, a framework applicable to Benin’s post-coup contest. Econometric studies (e.g., Bates & Krueger, 1993) link IMF structural adjustment programs to increased inequality and political instability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Benin’s 2023-2024 inflation rates (12.5% in 2023) align with IMF austerity impacts, yet these macroeconomic trends are rarely connected to electoral outcomes in media coverage.

Beninese Vodun cosmology frames leadership as a sacred trust (*Hounto*), with rulers expected to embody communal welfare—a stark contrast to Talon’s neoliberal governance that prioritises foreign investors over local communities. Artists like Romuald Hazoumé use satire to critique political elites, as seen in his 2016 series *La Bouche du Roi*, which critiques corruption and elite impunity. Spiritual leaders, including Catholic bishops and Muslim imams, have historically mediated political crises, yet their roles in Benin’s current transition are marginalised in secular electoral narratives.

Scenario modelling suggests Benin’s current trajectory risks escalating rural-urban inequality, potentially fueling mass protests or military interventions, as seen in Burkina Faso’s 2022 coup. Alternative futures include a 'developmental democracy' model (e.g., Rwanda’s post-1994 recovery) where elite continuity is paired with inclusive economic growth, or a 'failed state' path (e.g., Mali post-2012) if elite pacts fracture. Climate change exacerbates these risks: Benin’s 2023 floods displaced 200,000 people, yet adaptation policies remain underfunded due to austerity measures.

Northern Benin’s pastoralist Fulani communities face land dispossession from agribusiness expansion, with 40% of grazing lands lost since 2010, yet their grievances are excluded from electoral discourse. Informal traders in Cotonou’s Dantokpa Market, who contribute 60% of Benin’s GDP, suffer from CFA franc inflation and border closures, but their economic struggles are framed as 'informal sector resilience' rather than systemic exclusion. Women, who hold 7% of parliamentary seats, are sidelined despite their central role in food production and trade networks.