Pakistan’s mediation in US-Iran talks reflects postcolonial power shifts and historical alliances reshaping regional diplomacy

Pakistan’s mediation reflects a broader trend where postcolonial states adopt state-centric diplomacy while indigenous conflict resolution methods remain sidelined. Traditional practices, such as the Jirga system in Pashtun communities or the centuries-old 'panchayat' traditions in South Asia, emphasize consensus-building and restorative justice—principles that could inform more sustainable peace processes. However, these systems are often dismissed as 'backward' by Western frameworks, reinforcing a hierarchy of knowledge. The marginalization of such approaches perpetuates cycles of violence by ignoring locally rooted solutions.

The US-Iran-Pakistan dynamic is deeply entangled with the 1953 CIA-backed coup in Iran, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (which led to Pakistan’s proxy role), and the 1990s US-Pakistan alliance during the Afghan jihad. These historical interventions created the structural conditions for Pakistan’s current mediation role, as it became a hub for regional proxy conflicts. The 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) and its collapse further entrenched Pakistan’s position as a reluctant mediator, balancing US pressure with Iranian influence. Yet, mainstream narratives rarely trace these historical threads, instead treating each crisis as isolated.

Comparing Pakistan’s role to other non-Western mediators, such as Turkey’s involvement in Syria or South Africa’s post-apartheid reconciliation, reveals a pattern of states leveraging cultural and historical proximity to facilitate dialogue. In the Islamic world, mediation often relies on shared religious and linguistic ties (e.g., Urdu and Persian as lingua francas), which Western diplomats lack. However, this cross-cultural leverage is often co-opted by state interests, diluting its potential for grassroots peacebuilding. The emphasis on 'high-level' talks also overlooks the role of diaspora communities (e.g., Pakistani-Americans or Iranian-Canadians) in shaping informal dialogue channels.

Academic literature on third-party mediation (e.g., Bercovitch and Gartner, 2006) highlights that successful mediation requires impartiality, leverage, and cultural legitimacy—factors where Pakistan may have an edge due to its historical relationships with both the US and Iran. However, structural realist theories (e.g., Mearsheimer, 2001) suggest that Pakistan’s mediation is constrained by its own geopolitical dependencies, particularly its reliance on Gulf state funding and IMF loans. Quantitative studies on mediation success rates (e.g., the Uppsala Conflict Data Program) show that state-led mediation often fails to address root causes, instead focusing on short-term de-escalation. The lack of empirical data on Pakistan’s mediation efficacy further obscures its long-term impact.

Artistic and spiritual traditions in South Asia, such as Sufi poetry (e.g., Bulleh Shah’s works) or the concept of 'wahdat al-wujud' (unity of being) in Islamic mysticism, emphasize interconnectedness and reconciliation—principles that could inform diplomatic efforts. Pakistani musicians like Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan have historically used music to bridge divides, while Iranian poets like Rumi are celebrated for their messages of peace. However, these cultural tools are rarely integrated into formal mediation processes, which remain dominated by secular, state-centric frameworks. The spiritual dimension of mediation also includes the role of faith leaders (e.g., Shia clerics in Iran or Sunni scholars in Pakistan) in informal peacebuilding, which is often overlooked in secular analyses.

If Pakistan’s mediation model is to succeed long-term, it must transition from ad-hoc state-led interventions to institutionalized frameworks that include civil society, women’s groups, and minority voices. Scenario planning suggests that without addressing structural inequities (e.g., Iran’s economic isolation, Pakistan’s debt crisis), any peace deal will remain fragile. The rise of AI-driven diplomacy tools (e.g., predictive modeling for conflict escalation) could complement traditional mediation, but risks exacerbating power imbalances if deployed by Western actors. Future models should prioritize 'multi-track diplomacy,' integrating Track I (state), Track II (experts), and Track III (grassroots) efforts to ensure sustainability.

Marginalized groups—such as Afghan refugees in Pakistan, Baloch separatists, or Iranian Arabs in Khuzestan—are often the most affected by US-Iran tensions but have no seat at the negotiating table. Women’s groups in both countries, such as Iran’s 'White Wednesdays' movement or Pakistan’s Aurat March, have long advocated for peace but are excluded from formal processes. The framing of Pakistan’s mediation as a 'geopolitical flex' ignores how these communities navigate daily violence, from drone strikes to economic blockades. Their exclusion reinforces the cycle of top-down solutions that fail to address root causes, such as resource distribution or political representation.