Iran’s presidency weakened by supreme leader’s consolidation of power: systemic analysis of institutional erosion and regional implications

The article overlooks how Iran’s political system reflects indigenous Shia Islamic traditions of governance, where the supreme leader’s role is justified through religious jurisprudence rather than mere authoritarianism. Indigenous knowledge systems in the region emphasize collective decision-making, but these are systematically excluded in favor of Western models of democracy. The IRGC’s rise mirrors historical patterns of militarized governance in the Middle East, where state power is often derived from revolutionary legitimacy rather than electoral mandate.

The erosion of Iran’s presidency mirrors historical patterns in post-revolutionary states, where revolutionary elites consolidate power to prevent counter-revolutionary threats. The 1979 Iranian Revolution’s initial promise of democratic governance was gradually undermined by factional infighting and external pressures, a dynamic seen in other Islamic republics like Pakistan and Sudan. The supreme leader’s dominance also echoes the Ottoman caliphate’s fusion of religious and temporal authority, a model that persists in modified forms today.

Comparative analysis reveals that unelected power centers are not unique to Iran; in Thailand, the monarchy and military have historically overshadowed elected governments, while in Pakistan, the judiciary and military have repeatedly intervened in civilian affairs. In Latin America, military dictatorships often emerged from revolutionary movements, similar to the IRGC’s origins. These parallels suggest that Iran’s power dynamics are part of a broader global pattern where revolutionary legitimacy is used to justify authoritarian control.

Political science research on authoritarian consolidation highlights how revolutionary regimes often transition from populist governance to militarized control, as seen in Iran’s shift from Khomeini’s charismatic leadership to Khamenei’s institutionalized rule. The IRGC’s economic and military expansion aligns with theories of patrimonialism, where state resources are used to reward loyalists and suppress dissent. Quantitative studies on sanctions show they often strengthen hardline factions by creating economic scarcity that justifies increased security measures.

Persian poetry and art have long critiqued the gap between revolutionary ideals and authoritarian reality, as seen in the works of Forough Farrokhzad and Ahmad Shamlu, who lament the loss of democratic promise. Sufi traditions in Iran emphasize the spiritual dangers of unchecked power, a theme echoed in the poetry of Rumi and Hafez. The supreme leader’s authority is often framed in messianic terms, drawing on Shia eschatological beliefs that can blind followers to institutional decay.

Scenario modeling suggests that Iran’s political system will continue to oscillate between reformist and hardline factions unless structural reforms address the IRGC’s dominance and economic sanctions are lifted. A potential future involves a gradual liberalization if sanctions ease, but this risks elite backlash or military intervention, as seen in Egypt’s 2013 coup. Alternatively, continued economic strain could lead to mass protests, potentially triggering a new revolutionary cycle or deeper militarization.

The article erases the perspectives of Iranian women, ethnic minorities (e.g., Kurds, Baloch, Arabs), and reformist politicians who have been systematically excluded from power. These groups often face repression for advocating democratic reforms or cultural autonomy, as seen in the 2009 Green Movement crackdown. Their exclusion reinforces the supreme leader’s control but also fuels underground resistance networks that challenge the regime’s legitimacy.