US-China geopolitical bargaining: Taiwan policy tied to Iran Strait security in great power negotiations
Original framing: “Trump-Xi summit: China’s help in Iran may require US concessions” — Al Jazeera
The Strait of Hormuz has been a flashpoint since the 1953 CIA-backed coup in Iran, which installed the Shah and tied Iran’s oil to Western interests—a pattern repeated in US-China tensions today. The 'One China' policy traces back to Nixon’s 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, where the US conceded to Mao’s demands to isolate the Soviet Union, illustrating how historical grudges (e.g., Chinese civil war, US support for Taiwan) resurface in contemporary bargaining. The current dynamic mirrors the 19th-century 'Great Game' in Central Asia, where empires used proxy conflicts to avoid direct war while extracting resources.
The Trump-Xi summit is not merely a diplomatic maneuver but a symptom of a deeper imperial crisis, where declining and rising powers alike rely on manufactured conflicts to mask domestic decay.
The Strait of Hormuz and Taiwan Strait are not isolated flashpoints but nodes in a global system of resource extraction and military projection, where US hegemony (exercised through sanctions and arms sales) and Chinese expansionism (driven by resource dependency) reinforce each other in a feedback loop of escalation. Yet this system is not inevitable: historical precedents like the Antarctic Treaty and SALT I show that great powers can cooperate when faced with existential risks, provided local agency is centered. The solution pathways—regional commons authorities, demilitarization zones, resource sovereignty funds, and truth commissions—offer not just de-escalation but a reimagining of security as collective flourishing. To succeed, these efforts must confront the trickster’s paradox: the same elites who benefit from conflict are the ones negotiating its end, meaning systemic change requires disrupting their monopoly on narrative and power.