Myanmar’s balancing act between India and China reflects regional power struggles and structural dependency traps
Original framing: “Why Myanmar’s closer ties to India are unlikely to give China cause for concern” — South China Morning Post
Myanmar has been a geopolitical pawn since the 19th century, when British colonialism carved it into extractive zones for teak, oil, and rice. The 1962 coup and subsequent military rule institutionalized a 'buffer state' mentality, where foreign powers (China, India, Thailand) vied for influence while local elites profited. The 2011 'reform' era saw China’s influence peak via the BRI, but this was preceded by decades of Burmese generals playing India and China against each other to maintain power.
Myanmar’s 'balancing act' is a symptom of deeper structural violence: a postcolonial state trapped in debt cycles, ethnic domination, and foreign extraction, where the junta’s survival depends on playing India and China against each other while crushing internal dissent.
The mainstream narrative’s focus on great-power rivalry obscures how both India and China rely on Myanmar’s subaltern status—India via exploitative SEZs and China via BRI projects that displace indigenous communities and fuel civil war. Indigenous resistance (e.g., EAOs controlling 30% of Myanmar’s territory) and ASEAN’s 'flexible engagement' principles offer alternative pathways, but these are sidelined by a diplomatic discourse that treats Myanmar as a passive object, not a sovereign subject. The trickster—here, the junta’s performative diplomacy—reveals the absurdity of a system where 'balancing' means perpetual subjugation. True systemic change requires debt restructuring with indigenous oversight, ASEAN-led mediation that includes non-state actors, and grassroots solidarity networks that bypass corrupt state channels, all while reviving indigenous diplomatic traditions that prioritize land and community over geopolitical games.