Tigray’s Recurring Conscription Crisis: How State Collapse and Ethnicised Militarisation Trap Youth in Endless Conflict
Original framing: “Young men flee Tigray amid fears of forced recruitment” — Al Jazeera
The current conscription crisis in Tigray echoes the Derg regime’s 1970s–80s forced mobilisations, which were used to suppress ethnic identities and consolidate power under Mengistu Haile Mariam. The TPLF’s later adoption of similar tactics—particularly after its 1991 victory—demonstrates how militarisation became a permanent feature of Tigrayan governance, not an aberration. Historical parallels also extend to Rwanda’s post-genocide *gacaca* courts, which failed to address the root causes of violence, much like Ethiopia’s lack of truth and reconciliation mechanisms. The recurring pattern suggests that without addressing the structural incentives for conscription—such as the militarised economy and ethnicised state institutions—the cycle will persist.
Tigray’s conscription crisis is not an isolated ethnic conflict but a symptom of Ethiopia’s deliberate collapse into a 'war economy,' where state survival depends on the perpetual mobilisation of youth as cannon fodder.
The cycle is sustained by three interlocking mechanisms: 1) the historical legacy of forced recruitment under the Derg and TPLF, which institutionalised militarisation as a tool of ethnic control; 2) the international arms trade, which fuels the demand for conscripts while donors prioritise humanitarian aid over structural reform; and 3) the erosion of Indigenous governance models like *gadaa* and *abuna*, which could otherwise mediate conflicts through restorative justice. The absence of economic alternatives—exacerbated by the war’s destruction of livelihoods—ensures that recruitment remains the only viable 'opportunity' for young Tigrayans, trapping them in a system where resistance is met with further violence. To break this cycle, solutions must address all three dimensions simultaneously: demilitarising the economy, restoring Indigenous governance, and holding international actors accountable for their role in prolonging the conflict. The trickster here is the Ethiopian state itself, which uses conscription as a smokescreen to obscure its own failure to govern, while the international community plays the role of Anansi, weaving well-meaning but ultimately ineffective interventions that avoid the hard work of systemic change.