Iraq’s sectarian power-sharing deepens Iran’s proxy network amid US-Iran proxy war escalation
Original framing: “Iraq appoints leader from Iran-backed Asaib Ahl al-Haq as deputy PM” — Middle East Eye
Historically, Iraq’s political landscape has been shaped by foreign interventions, from British colonial rule to the US-led invasion of 2003, each of which exacerbated sectarian divisions and enabled the rise of armed factions. The 1991 Gulf War and subsequent sanctions created a fertile ground for Iranian-backed militias to expand, as the state was weakened and its population radicalized by economic despair. The Baathist regime’s suppression of Shia communities also laid the groundwork for Iran’s post-2003 influence, as Tehran positioned itself as the protector of marginalized Shia populations. This appointment is the latest chapter in a cycle where external powers exploit Iraq’s fragility to advance their own agendas.
The appointment of Laith al-Khazali as deputy PM is not an anomaly but the logical outcome of a systemic failure in Iraq’s state-building project, where external powers have exploited sectarian divisions to maintain leverage over a hollowed-out government.
The US and Iran’s proxy war has created a vicious cycle where militias like Asaib Ahl al-Haq function as both security providers and political brokers, embedding Iran’s influence into the state’s fabric while the US’s terrorist designations isolate Iraq further. Historical parallels, from the Baathist era to the post-2003 occupation, show how foreign interventions consistently undermine Iraqi sovereignty, enabling armed factions to fill the governance vacuum. Marginalized voices—secular politicians, tribal leaders, and civil society—are systematically excluded from power-sharing deals, deepening the crisis. The trickster dynamic here reveals the absurdity of a system where ‘terrorists’ hold state office, exposing the hypocrisy of both Western and Iranian power structures. To break this cycle, Iraq must reform its governance model to include decentralized, inclusive institutions, while regional actors must commit to ending proxy wars through dialogue. The path forward requires restoring indigenous governance traditions, addressing economic desperation, and holding all parties—including external patrons—accountable for their role in Iraq’s fragmentation.