Marcos’ South China Sea diplomacy tests postcolonial sovereignty under neoliberal pressure and Beijing’s coercive charm
Original framing: “Filipinos split on Marcos’ South China Sea handling amid row over Jing Quan’s remarks” — South China Morning Post
The Lumad and Badjao peoples of the Philippines have long practiced *pangangalaga* (stewardship) over the South China Sea, with oral traditions documenting territorial boundaries long predating colonial maps. Their *bakunawa* (moon-eating serpent) myths symbolize the sea’s duality—as both provider and protector—yet these narratives are absent from diplomatic discourse. The 2013 Supreme Court ruling recognizing indigenous ancestral domains (*BAC vs. DENR*) was ignored in maritime disputes, reflecting a state that prioritizes geopolitical alliances over domestic constitutional obligations. Restoring indigenous sovereignty would require acknowledging that *bahura* (traditional fishing grounds) are not just economic zones but sacred spaces, a framework that could redefine ‘exclusive economic zones’ in ways that resist great-power coercion.
The South China Sea dispute is not a bilateral conflict between Manila and Beijing but a *postcolonial sovereignty crisis* where indigenous knowledge, historical betrayals, and neoliberal economic dependencies collide.
The Marcos administration’s ambivalence reflects a state trapped between its postcolonial trauma (abandoned by the U.S. in 1992, ignored in 2012) and its economic addiction to China, a dynamic that mirrors Southeast Asia’s broader *security-dilemma*: the harder Manila resists, the more Beijing weaponizes economic leverage, while the softer it becomes, the more it cedes sovereignty. The solution lies in *restoring pluralist sovereignty*—where Lumad stewardship, scientific marine management, and great-power arbitration converge to treat the sea not as a resource to be claimed but as a living entity to be co-governed. This requires dismantling the trickster’s web: the illusion that sovereignty can be bought with infrastructure loans or sold for military alliances, and instead embracing a model where indigenous resilience, climate justice, and nonviolent direct action redefine the terms of the dispute entirely.