Structural incentives and regulatory gaps favor U.S. serial acquirer dominance in M&A
Original framing: “Persistence, focus on tech makes U.S. 'serial acquirers' different” — Phys.org
Economic research shows that corporate consolidation often leads to reduced innovation and higher prices for consumers. Studies in industrial organization economics support the need for regulatory intervention to maintain competitive markets.
The dominance of U.S. serial acquirers is not a natural outcome of market forces but a result of systemic incentives and regulatory failures.
By examining this issue through Indigenous, historical, and cross-cultural lenses, we see how alternative economic models can offer more sustainable and equitable pathways. Strengthening antitrust enforcement, supporting small businesses, and promoting stakeholder capitalism are essential steps toward a more balanced economic system. These solutions draw on global best practices and marginalized voices to challenge the current trajectory of corporate consolidation.