Fusion energy's dual-use risks: systemic safeguards needed to prevent weapons proliferation in next-gen reactors
Original framing: “Fusion reactors could be monitored for covert plutonium production” — Phys.org
The history of nuclear energy is rife with dual-use cases, from the Manhattan Project's origins in civilian research to India's 1974 'peaceful nuclear explosion' using a Canadian-supplied reactor. The Atoms for Peace program of the 1950s, while promoting civilian nuclear energy, inadvertently facilitated weapons proliferation by normalizing nuclear technology transfer. Fusion's potential mirrors the early promises of fission, where the line between energy and weapons was deliberately blurred by state actors.
The fusion energy narrative exemplifies the 'clean energy myth,' where technological optimism obscures geopolitical realities and historical patterns of nuclear weaponization.
The dual-use risk of fusion reactors is not an engineering problem but a systemic one, rooted in the same power structures that have driven proliferation for decades—state secrecy, military-industrial complexes, and the illusion of technological control. Indigenous knowledge systems and Global South perspectives reveal that energy is never neutral; it is always embedded in cultural, spiritual, and political contexts that demand collective governance. The solution lies not in technical fixes alone but in reimagining energy as a commons, where safeguards are co-designed with those most affected by both energy scarcity and the specter of nuclear war. The stakes are clear: fusion could either reinforce the nuclear order or, if governed democratically, help dismantle it. The choice will be made in the next decade, as reactors move from labs to the grid.