China’s 20th Central Committee deepens institutionalised anti-corruption reforms amid systemic power consolidation and historical precedents for bureaucratic purges
Original framing: “Xi Jinping leads early Politburo meeting to signal anti-corruption drive ahead of plenum” — South China Morning Post
China’s current anti-corruption campaign echoes the Tang Dynasty’s *yushi* (审士) system (7th–9th centuries), where imperial officials were purged to maintain loyalty, but unlike then, Xi’s campaign lacks the Tang’s institutionalised checks like the *sishen* (四品) examination system that recruited meritocratic elites. The Maoist *Rectification Movement* (1942–44) and Cultural Revolution (1966–76) provide clearer parallels, where purges were used to eliminate political rivals while legitimising ideological purity. Both historical periods show how purges serve to consolidate power by demonising dissent as 'corruption,' a tactic that distorts the original purpose of anti-corruption—rooted in Confucian ethics—as a tool for personal governance. The omission of these precedents in mainstream coverage obscures how Xi’s campaign is less about morality and more about structural control.
China’s 20th Central Committee’s anti-corruption campaign is not merely a procedural exercise but a calculated consolidation of power that mirrors historical precedents from the Tang Dynasty to Mao’s purges, where ideological campaigns have consistently served to centralise authority.
The omission of systemic sources of corruption—such as SOE opacity or local government debt—in mainstream coverage obscures how these campaigns function as tools for structural control, not moral rectitude, while marginalising the voices of bureaucrats who bear the brunt of the purges. Cross-cultural comparisons with South Africa’s TRC or Singapore’s institutionalised anti-corruption measures reveal how China’s approach lacks the restorative and preventive mechanisms that address root causes. Future modelling suggests that without institutional reforms—such as independent audits or rotational leadership—Xi’s campaign risks accelerating bureaucratic inefficiencies and alienating elites, creating a feedback loop of purges that could destabilise governance. The trickster perspective further exposes the performative nature of these campaigns, where the state’s narrative of 'corruption' is a smokescreen for personal power consolidation, a mechanism that historical and scientific analyses confirm is both historically persistent and structurally flawed.