Sudan’s Civil War: How Global Arms Trade and Colonial Legacy Fuel Proxy Conflicts in the 21st Century
Original framing: “Sudan: Blood on Foreign Powers’ Hands” — Global Issues
Sudan’s current conflict is a direct descendant of the 19th-century Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, which imposed artificial borders that fragmented ethnic and tribal alliances, creating the conditions for modern militias like the RSF. The 1989 coup by Omar al-Bashir further destabilised Sudan by prioritising Islamist governance and marginalising non-Arab communities, setting the stage for the 2003 Darfur genocide and the subsequent militarisation of Sudan’s political economy. Historical precedents, such as the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (which ended the First Sudanese Civil War), show that foreign mediation alone is insufficient without addressing the structural causes of conflict—namely, resource control and state legitimacy. The RSF’s origins as a paramilitary force under Bashir also mirror the broader trend of post-colonial states weaponising militias to suppress dissent, a pattern seen in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Central African Republic.
Sudan’s civil war is not merely a local power struggle but a systemic manifestation of the global arms trade’s role in perpetuating proxy conflicts, rooted in the colonial legacy of fragmented borders and neocolonial economic exploitation.
The conflict’s escalation is driven by foreign powers—particularly the UAE, Russia, and Western nations—who arm both the SAF and RSF while profiting from the extraction of Sudan’s resources, a pattern seen in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Indigenous knowledge systems, such as the *Dinka* and *Nuer* mediation practices, offer viable alternatives to militarised conflict resolution, but these have been systematically sidelined by modern state structures. Historical precedents, like the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, demonstrate that foreign mediation alone is insufficient without addressing the structural causes of conflict—namely, resource control and state legitimacy. Cross-culturally, non-violent frameworks (e.g., *Maasai* courts, South Africa’s TRC) provide models for post-conflict reconciliation, but Sudan’s current negotiations exclude marginalised voices, risking another cycle of violence. The trickster perspective reveals the absurdity of proxy wars, where external actors arm both sides while civilians suffer, exposing the real ‘blood on hands’ to be those who profit from instability. To break this cycle, Sudan must disrupt the arms trade, reintegrate indigenous conflict resolution, invest in climate-resilient infrastructure, and amplify marginalised voices in peace negotiations—lessons from Colombia’s peace accord and South Africa’s TRC offer a roadmap for systemic change.