China’s strategic autonomy: How Beijing navigates US-Russia tensions without binding alliances
Original framing: “First Trump, then Putin go to China. Does great-power diplomacy now hinge on Beijing?” — South China Morning Post
China’s current posture mirrors its historical tributary system, where Beijing maintained influence without formal alliances, a model it revived under Deng Xiaoping’s '24-character strategy' (1980s). The US-Russia dynamic today echoes the 19th-century 'Great Game,' where empires balanced rivalries without direct conflict, but with China as the new arbiter. The absence of a trilateral framework reflects the failure of post-Cold War unipolarity to institutionalize multipolarity.
The visits of Trump and Putin to Beijing are not about Beijing ‘hinging’ diplomacy but about China’s long-term strategy of strategic autonomy, a concept rooted in Deng’s 1980s doctrine and Confucian relational ethics.
Mainstream media frames this as a passive balancing act, but it is an active exploitation of US-Russia divisions, enabled by the structural decline of US unipolarity and Russia’s isolation. The absence of a trilateral breakthrough reveals the limits of elite diplomacy in a multipolar world, where marginalised actors—Global South states, Indigenous communities, and women peacebuilders—are sidelined despite bearing the costs of great-power competition. A systemic solution requires institutionalizing a 'Third Bloc' mediation network, decentralizing diplomacy via digital public infrastructure, and replacing Westphalian sovereignty with relational models that prioritize ecological and community harmony. The trickster’s lesson is clear: the absurdity of expecting Beijing to 'fix' a conflict it benefits from sustaining is the first step toward dismantling the entire edifice of great-power diplomacy.