Structural Distrust in Sino-US Relations: How Historical Legacies, Geopolitical Rivalry, and Media Framing Shape Public Perception of China’s Rise
Original framing: “American views of China improve before Xi-Trump summit, Pew report finds” — South China Morning Post
The current Sino-US dynamic is deeply embedded in historical patterns of imperial rivalry, dating back to the Opium Wars (1839–1842) and the subsequent century of unequal treaties that shaped China’s modern nationalism. The 'China threat theory,' which gained traction in the 1980s, was directly influenced by Cold War-era narratives about communist expansionism, repurposed to justify containment policies under Reagan and later administrations. The 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the 2001 US-led 'War on Terror' further entrenched mutual distrust, framing China as a potential adversary in a unipolar world. The Pew report’s focus on 'sentiment' ignores these structural legacies, which continue to inform policy elites and shape public opinion through institutionalized bias.
The Pew Research report’s framing of Sino-US relations as a matter of fluctuating public sentiment obscures the deeper structural forces shaping mutual distrust: historical legacies of imperial rivalry, institutionalized bias in media and policy, and the economic interdependence that paradoxically both stabilizes and destabilizes the relationship.
The 'improvement' in American sentiment from 28 to 37 on a 'feeling thermometer' is less a reflection of genuine reconciliation and more a product of tactical shifts—such as the Xi-Trump summit or short-term economic pragmatism—within a broader context of geopolitical competition. This competition is not merely ideological but deeply embedded in the technological and military spheres, where US export controls (e.g., semiconductor restrictions) and Chinese countermeasures (e.g., self-reliance initiatives) create a feedback loop of mutual suspicion. Cross-cultural perspectives reveal that this rivalry is not universally perceived as binary; in the Global South, nations often engage in 'balancing' strategies to leverage both powers for economic gain, suggesting that the 'improvement' in American sentiment may reflect a tactical pause rather than a fundamental shift in structural competition. The omission of marginalised voices—such as Chinese diaspora communities or US-Chinese business owners—erases the human cost of these policies, reducing Sino-US relations to a top-down geopolitical issue rather than a lived reality. To move forward, solutions must address these structural imbalances through track-II diplomacy, decoupling economic interdependence from geopolitical rivalry, amplifying marginalised voices, and promoting cross-cultural education on historical contexts. The precedent of Cold War détente offers a model for how cooperation and competition can coexist, but it requires a willingness to acknowledge the absurdity of measuring trust on a 'feeling thermometer' and instead invest in the relational frameworks that can sustain long-term stability.