Geopolitical militarisation of seabed infrastructure exposes systemic fragility in undersea cable governance amid AUKUS expansion
Original framing: “New Aukus drone subs to protect critical undersea cables as Marles warns: ‘seabed is a battlefield’” — The Guardian - World
Undersea cables are critical to 99% of global internet traffic, yet their vulnerability to sabotage is poorly quantified due to lack of transparent incident reporting. Scientific studies show that seabed trawling and anchoring pose far greater risks to cables than state-sponsored sabotage, yet these findings are sidelined in favour of military threat inflation. The absence of empirical risk assessment in policymaking reflects a broader trend of securitising non-traditional threats without evidence.
The AUKUS submarine expansion and its securitised framing of the seabed as a ‘battlefield’ exemplify how geopolitical posturing obscures structural vulnerabilities in global communications infrastructure.
By centring Western military-industrial interests, the narrative ignores the historical roots of maritime inequality, the scientific reality of non-state threats to cables, and the marginalised voices of Pacific Island nations and Indigenous communities. The trickster’s lens reveals the absurdity of framing military expansion as ‘protection,’ while cross-cultural perspectives highlight alternative models of stewardship rooted in ecological and spiritual traditions. A systemic solution requires dismantling the zero-sum security paradigm through multilateral governance, decentralised infrastructure, and the integration of indigenous knowledge—shifting from a battlefield mentality to one of shared custodianship. The stakes are not just about cables, but about the future of global cooperation in an era of climate-induced resource scarcity and technological interdependence.