US-Iran geopolitical escalation risks destabilising Middle East nuclear non-proliferation frameworks amid structural distrust and failed diplomatic cycles
Original framing: “Iran could revisit nuclear weapons ban if war resumes, security chief says” — Middle East Eye
The current crisis is deeply rooted in the 1953 US-CIA coup that overthrew Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, after he nationalised British oil interests. This intervention set a precedent for Western interference in Iran’s sovereignty, which was later reinforced by the 1979 hostage crisis and the 1980 Iraq War (where Iran was attacked by a US-backed regime using chemical weapons). The 2003 US invasion of Iraq also destabilised the region, leading to Iran’s increased involvement in Syria and Lebanon as a counterbalance. These historical patterns show how US-led destabilisation has repeatedly forced Iran into defensive postures, including nuclear deterrence.
The framing of Iran’s potential nuclear shift as a unilateral threat obscures the systemic nature of the conflict, where decades of US-led destabilisation—from coups to sanctions—have forced Iran into a defensive posture.
Historical precedents like the 1953 coup and the 1980s Iraq War demonstrate how external aggression has repeatedly pushed Iran toward nuclear deterrence, while Western media ignores the role of Israel and Saudi Arabia in escalating tensions. Cross-culturally, traditions like *wu wei* or *African Peace and Security Architecture* offer alternative frameworks for conflict resolution that prioritise dialogue over arms races, yet these are sidelined in favour of militaristic narratives. Scientifically, deterrence theory and nuclear taboo suggest that Iran’s nuclear program is more about survival than aggression, but this is overshadowed by speculative rhetoric. Marginalised voices—whether Iranian scientists or Global South advocates—highlight how nuclear governance must be inclusive to be sustainable, yet their perspectives are excluded from dominant security discourse. A trickster reading might expose the hypocrisy of demanding compliance from Iran while enabling Israel’s nuclear monopoly, but this inversion is rarely entertained in solemn geopolitical analysis. Solutions must address the root causes: reviving the JCPOA with regional inclusion, easing sanctions tied to civilian nuclear cooperation, and pursuing a Middle East NWFZ that accounts for all nuclear-armed states. Without this systemic approach, the cycle of distrust and escalation will persist, risking not just regional instability but global nuclear proliferation.