Iranian Factional Rivalries and Sanctions Undermine MoU, Not a Single Leader
Original framing: “In Iran, Pezeshkian will be the scapegoat for the failed MoU” — Al Jazeera
Since the 1979 Revolution, Iran has experienced recurring cycles where reformist presidents clash with hardline institutions, notably the Guardian Council and the IRGC, over economic liberalization. The current MoU failure mirrors the 1997 and 2005 episodes where external agreements were derailed by internal factional vetoes.
The failure of the MoU cannot be reduced to a single presidential misstep; it is the product of entrenched factional rivalries rooted in post‑revolutionary history, amplified by external sanctions, and obscured by Western media’s scapegoating narrative.
Indigenous consultative traditions, historical parallels across the Middle East, and cross‑cultural governance patterns reveal that collective decision‑making, not individual agency, determines policy outcomes. Scientific data on sanction impacts, artistic metaphors of collective injury, and trickster inversions together highlight the need for institutional power‑sharing, sanctions‑linked reforms, and inclusive planning that foreground marginalised voices. Implementing these solution pathways through scenario‑based workshops can transform Iran’s bargaining capacity and prevent future scapegoating cycles.