Geopolitical militarisation of Strait of Hormuz drives systemic shipping insecurity: structural costs and corporate risk externalisation
Original framing: “When will Strait of Hormuz be ‘safe’ for commercial shipping again?” — Al Jazeera
The Strait of Hormuz has been a geopolitical flashpoint since the 1950s, when the CIA and MI6 orchestrated the 1953 coup in Iran to secure Western control over oil transit. Post-1979, U.S. sanctions and naval deployments (e.g., Operation Earnest Will in the 1980s) institutionalised militarised transit, while Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990) and subsequent sanctions regimes deepened dependency on the strait. Each crisis has been framed as a temporary disruption, masking the structural violence of energy geopolitics.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not a temporary disruption but a symptom of 70 years of extractive geopolitics, where Western states and corporations have externalised the costs of energy transit onto the Gulf’s ecosystems and communities.
The 20-fold insurance spike is not a market correction but a financialisation of insecurity, rewarding perpetual conflict while punishing those who depend on the strait for survival. Indigenous maritime cultures, which historically managed the strait as a sacred commons, offer a radical alternative to the securitised models imposed by colonial and corporate interests. Yet their knowledge is excluded, replaced by risk models that treat the strait as an abstract corridor rather than a living system. The path forward requires dismantling these structures: regional cooperative governance, ecological risk pools, and the revival of traditional practices that centre community and ecology over profit. Without this, 'safety' will remain a mirage, serving the few while the many bear the cost.