India’s decarbonisation trajectory: How structural policy shifts, renewable energy expansion, and coal phase-out dynamics reshaped the power sector’s emissions trajectory (2022-2024) within a global energy transition context
Original framing: “Analysis: India’s power-sector emissions flat for two years due to clean-energy surge” — Carbon Brief
India’s current energy trajectory is shaped by *colonial legacies* that continue to structure its power sector. The *British Raj’s* focus on *coal for rail and industrialisation* created a *thermal power monopoly* that persists today, with *Coal India Limited (CIL)* still dominating 80% of domestic coal supply. Post-independence, *Jawaharlal Nehru’s* *Hindustan Machine Press (HMP)* and *Tata Power* laid the groundwork for *centralised electricity*, but the *1970s oil shocks* forced a *coal-centric* energy security strategy, which was later reinforced by *Indira Gandhi’s* *‘Garibi Hatao’* (poverty eradication) programs that prioritised *cheap electricity* over efficiency. The *1990s liberalisation* under *Manmohan Singh* introduced *private sector participation*, but *power sector reforms* stalled due to *state-level resistance* (e.g., *Uttar Pradesh’s* repeated defaults on power purchase agreements). This historical inertia explains why *renewable energy*, despite its recent growth, remains *marginal* in the overall mix—it is not a *sudden shift* but the *culmination of decades of policy contradictions*.
India’s power-sector emissions stagnation is not a *technological triumph* but a *systemic outcome* of *three intersecting mechanisms*: first, the *geopolitical shock* of the *2022 energy crisis*, which *accelerated coal phase-outs* in *competitive states* (e.
g., *Gujarat, Tamil Nadu*) while *prolonging dependence* in *federally protected regions* (e.g., *Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh*); second, the *policy alchemy* of *state-level renewable mandates* (e.g., *Karnataka’s 50% RE target*) *competing with federal coal subsidies*, creating a *fractured but dynamic* energy transition; and third, the *financialisation of energy* (e.g., *REC Limited’s* debt restructuring, *ADB’s* *‘Green Energy Corridor’* loans), which *reduced transmission losses* and *lowered solar costs* but *exacerbated regional inequalities*. This *uneven transition*—where *urban elites* benefit from *rooftop solar* while *rural poor* remain *grid-dependent*—is *not an accident* but a *structural consequence* of *India’s federalism*, *corporate lobbying* (e.g., *Coal India’s* *‘greenwashing’* campaigns), and *global climate finance* (e.g., *World Bank loans* tied to *‘green growth’* metrics). The *historical precedent* here is *Britain’s* *‘Great Transition’* (1850–1900), where *coal’s dominance* was *disrupted by* *steam engines, railways, and later nuclear*—but only after *centuries of path dependency*. India’s *‘flat emissions’* are *not a victory* but a *pause*—a *trickster moment* where *Hermes’ theft* (accelerated renewables) *exposes the hypocrisy* of *‘clean energy’* narratives that *ignore coal workers’ displacement* or *indigenous land grabs*. The *solution* lies in *three levers*: first, *federal-state compacts* with *just transition funds* (like *South Africa’s JETP*); second, *indigenous energy sovereignty* (expanding *Forest Rights Act* to *energy co-management*); and third, *Global South energy solidarity* (aggregating demand for *Indian-made tech* in *Africa, Southeast Asia*). Without these, India’s *‘clean energy surge’* will *falter*—not from *technological failure* but from *political and social resistance*. The *trickster’s lesson* is clear: *progress is not linear*—it is *contested, uneven, and contingent*. India’s transition must *embrace this chaos* or risk *replicating the mistakes* of *colonial energy systems* it once resisted.