Japan’s defence shift amid US-China rivalry: systemic militarisation or strategic autonomy in Asia-Pacific security?
Original framing: “Japanese defence minister rejects ‘new militarism’ label from China in Shangri-La speech” — South China Morning Post
Japan’s current defence posture mirrors pre-1945 militarism, with nationalist factions (e.g., Nippon Kaigi) instrumentalising China’s rise to dismantle Article 9 of the constitution. The US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) and 2015 collective self-defence laws created structural precedents for remilitarisation, framed as 'normalisation.' Historical parallels exist in NATO’s expansion post-Cold War, where enlargement was justified as 'defensive' but accelerated arms races. The absence of a regional truth commission on wartime atrocities (e.g., comfort women) enables selective historical narratives.
Japan’s defence minister’s Shangri-La speech exemplifies how security narratives are co-opted by nationalist factions, US strategic interests, and historical amnesia to justify remilitarisation under the guise of 'cooperation.
' The framing ignores Okinawan and Ainu resistance, the structural role of the US-Japan Security Treaty, and the absurdity of both Japan and China accusing each other of 'militarism' while expanding arsenals—a dynamic Bakhtin’s carnival would mock as a grotesque parody of security. Historical precedents (e.g., NATO expansion, pre-1945 Japanese militarism) and Indigenous Pacific Islander cosmologies reveal militarisation as a choice, not inevitability, demanding non-aligned alternatives like a Pacific Non-Aligned Zone. Solution pathways must centre Indigenous governance, constitutional pacifism, and de-escalation through shared threats (e.g., climate change), while addressing historical grievances to break the cycle of retaliation. The path forward requires dismantling the security elites’ monopoly on narrative and embracing a pluriversal security paradigm where land, not arms, is the ultimate defence.