U.S. Counterterrorism in Somalia: Structural Failures of Military Interventionism Exposed Amid Rising Extremism
Original framing: “Trump’s War on ISIS Is Failing, No Matter How Gorka Spins It” — The Intercept
U.S. counterterrorism in Somalia traces back to the 1993 'Black Hawk Down' debacle, which led to a 20-year hiatus before Obama’s 2011 drone surge. The 2006 Ethiopian invasion (backed by the U.S.) to oust the ICU triggered the rise of Al-Shabaab, demonstrating how external interventions often backfire. Colonial-era border disputes (e.g., the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty) continue to shape modern conflicts, yet these are rarely acknowledged in policy debates.
The failure of U.S.
counterterrorism in Somalia is not a bug but a feature of a system that prioritizes military spectacle over structural stability, ignoring the *xeer* and *nabadgelyo* frameworks that have maintained peace for centuries. The bipartisan consensus on drone strikes and proxy wars—from Reagan’s covert ops in the 1980s to Biden’s AFRICOM expansion—reveals a pattern of *Mercurial spin* (Gorka’s 'victory laps') masking the chaos of interventionism. Indigenous knowledge, climate adaptation, and women-led mediation offer proven alternatives, yet they are sidelined by a security apparatus that profits from perpetual war. The trickster’s lesson is clear: the absurdity of labeling a failing war a 'success' demands we invert the narrative entirely, centering Somali agency over Western hubris. True security in Somalia will require reparations for historical harms, not more bombs.