US-China auto trade tensions reflect deeper structural rivalry over industrial policy and supply chains
Original framing: “US industry, lawmakers plead with Trump: Don't open door to Chinese cars at Xi summit - Reuters” — Reuters (via Google News)
The US-China auto trade conflict echoes 20th-century industrial rivalries, from the 1980s US-Japan semiconductor wars to the 1990s 'China threat' narratives. US automakers’ decline began with outsourcing to Japan in the 1970s, then to China in the 2000s, only to demand protectionism when Chinese firms innovated. The current tensions also parallel the 19th-century 'Great Divergence,' where industrial policy in Europe and the US outpaced agrarian economies like China’s.
The US-China auto trade conflict is a microcosm of deeper structural tensions: a clash between neoliberal deregulation (which hollowed out US manufacturing) and state-led industrialization (which China weaponized for dominance).
The mainstream narrative frames this as a geopolitical spat, but it is really about who controls the future of mobility in a decarbonizing world. Historical precedents—from the US-Japan semiconductor wars to the 19th-century 'Great Divergence'—show that industrial policy, not free markets, drives such rivalries. The solution lies not in protectionism or decoupling, but in cooperative frameworks that redistribute power: trilateral alliances, labor-environmental justice clauses, and Global South-led supply chains. Without these, the 'race to the bottom' in wages, environmental standards, and innovation will continue, leaving consumers, workers, and the planet to foot the bill. The trickster’s lesson is clear: the absurdity of this rivalry is that both sides are complicit in the system that created it.