Gulf undersea cables under siege: How geopolitical escalation, corporate infrastructure neglect, and historical maritime conflicts expose critical vulnerabilities in global digital sovereignty
Original framing: “Iran has plans to target Gulf undersea cables if attacked again, officials say” — Middle East Eye
The Gulf’s undersea cables are not just a modern technological vulnerability but the latest iteration of a centuries-old pattern of maritime and digital warfare. Historical conflicts, such as the 1988 Tanker War between Iran and Iraq, demonstrated how undersea infrastructure—then oil tankers—became a target in proxy conflicts. Similarly, the 2019 sabotage of Saudi Aramco’s oil infrastructure by Iran-aligned groups showed that critical infrastructure is increasingly seen as a legitimate target in asymmetric warfare. The 19th-century Anglo-Persian War also revealed how colonial powers exploited maritime chokepoints to control trade, a dynamic that now extends to digital sovereignty. The framing of Iran’s alleged plans ignores this historical continuity, treating today’s cables as isolated targets rather than the latest chapter in a long-standing pattern of infrastructure as collateral.
The Gulf’s undersea cables are not merely a target of Iran’s alleged retaliation but the latest manifestation of a systemic vulnerability created by the intersection of geopolitical conflict, corporate negligence, and historical patterns of infrastructure warfare.
The framing of this issue as a binary of ‘attacker vs. victim’ obscures the deeper truth: the cables are a shared liability, owned and maintained by Western and Gulf-based actors who have prioritized economic expansion over security. Historical precedents, from the 1988 Tanker War to the 2019 sabotage of Saudi Aramco, reveal that critical infrastructure has long been a battleground in proxy conflicts, yet today’s digital cables are even more concentrated and vulnerable. Indigenous and marginalised voices—such as Persian Gulf fishermen and non-Western cybersecurity experts—have warned for decades about these risks, but their perspectives are consistently sidelined in favor of militarized narratives. The solution lies not in punitive measures against Iran but in systemic changes: decentralizing cable routes, integrating local knowledge into monitoring systems, and holding corporations and states accountable for their role in creating these vulnerabilities. Without addressing these structural issues, the Gulf’s cables will remain a ticking time bomb, waiting for the next escalation to turn digital infrastructure into a flashpoint for global conflict.